ABSTRACT: This paper examines an adverse selection economy in which efficient resource allocation is supported by intermediary contracts (coalitions). Agents differ along an ex ante publicly observeable dimension, so that the equilibrium arrangement yields a diverse set of financial arrangements among borrowers, lenders and intermediaries. Loans made by intermediaries would appear to be mispriced relative to a naive benchmark that ignores the (unobserveable) adverse selection aspects of the environment. The model also yields an equilibrium mix of intermediated and direct finance which is broadly consistent with popular notions about the determinants of that mix.
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Introduction
The theory of financial intermediation has, in recent years, produced a variety of models of the role played by intermediation in the financing of productive activity. In many of these models, intermediary institutions arise as a response to a problem of information.
Among the various information 1 problems which may constrain exchange in model economies, adverse selection may be particularly relevant to the use of intermediary organizations. The pre-contract information asymmetry in adverse selection environments has proven to be especially troublesome for the operation of classical market mechanisms. One argument that arises from these difficulties is that social 2 institutions might be expected to emerge that internalize the adverse selection problem. This is the approach taken by Miyazaki (1977) for the case of firms as internal labor markets and by Boyd and Prescott (1986) for the case of financial intermediaries. In the Boyd and Prescott environment, agents are endowed with resources and with risky productive projects the productivity of which is private information. The allocation problem is, then, to sort agents so that no bad projects are funded with resources before providing before all good projects. This sorting is achieved through the use of two instruments. First, as in many private information environments, outcome contingent payment schedules can help induce self-selection. Second, a technology that delivers a noisy signal of an agent's type can be applied prior to the funding decision. It is this second instrument that links the Boyd and Prescott approach to much of the other recent work on theory of banking. This work often focuses on the information production activities of banks, although such production often takes the form of ex post monitoring as opposed to ex ante evaluation.
While the information production activities of banks and other intermediaries is clearly important, this paper focuses more directly on the implications of adverse selection per se. Indeed, in the Boyd and Prescott environment, it is adverse selection and not the mere presence of an information production technology that gives rise to the need for intermediaries. Under adverse selection, achieving an efficient allocation of resources sometimes requires cross subsidization of some agents by others. This sort of subsidization cannot be achieved in a nonintermediated market where each transaction must meet a common market rate of return. Hence, adverse selection can create a role for intermediation even in the absence of an explicit information production technology. This point was made by Lacker and Weinberg (1993) . This paper extends the adverse selection approach to financial intermediation in a way that seeks to allow the framework to address and interpret observations about cross sectional differences in financial relationships in an economy. This is done by examining an economy in which agents can be imperfectly distinguished by publicly observable characteristics. Agents retain exclusive private information, however, about the true productivities of their productive projects; publicly observed characteristics merely determine an agent's probability of having a particular type.
If all agents were identical ex ante (no public information), the model presented in section 2 below would be a special case of that in Lacker and Weinberg. For this special case, section 3 discusses the possible inefficiency of a non-intermediated market (securities market) equilibrium, and presents the allocation that meets the requirements of cooperative solution concepts that have been the focus of Boyd and Prescott, Lacker and Weinberg (1993, 1995) and others. Section 4 then extends the results to the case with heterogeneous public information regarding agents and discusses some cross sectional characteristics of the equilibrium arrangement. One such characteristic is the pricing of loans. The presence of adverse selection results in pricing that is "smoother" across risk classes than would be implied by only publicly available information. An outsider's observation may well be based only on such public information, ignoring the fact that loans need to be structures to induce self selection among observationally identical potential borrowers. Hence, this model might provide an interpretation to the claims of some observers that banks tend not to fully adjust their loan pricing in response to observeable differences in credit risk.
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Many models of adverse selection imply an economy that is either entirely intermediated or entirely nonintermediated. In section 5, the model is extended to allow agents to overcome the adverse selection problem on their own, without the use of intermediated funds. Such direct financing, however, requires the expenditure of resources to publicly establish one's true type. If one assumes that the resource costs of "convincing the market" are decreasing in an agent's observeable quality, then the result follows that the best borrowers avoid by-pass the intermediated market and raise funds by issuing claims directly to investors. Such a general equilibrium model of an economy's mix of intermediated and direct financing is essential for evaluating and interpreting empirically observed trends in that mix, such as the much discussed "decline of banking." 4 An additional feature of the adverse selection approach to financial intermediation is that it provides an alternative formalization of the notion of relationship banking. Other authors have noted the importance of multiperiod or multiproduct relationships in overcoming informational constraints. Typically, the formal description of a relationship is one in which the lender produces information about the borrower in the course of providing one product or service. This information then gives the lender a comparative advantage (and sometime monopoly bargaining power over the borrower) in providing an additional service. One example is Nakamura (1993), where information produced in the provision of deposit services enhances the bank's ability to monitor a borrower. In another example, analyzed by Rajan(1992) and Sharpe (1990) , information produced in the process of lending to and monitoring a borrower in one period give the an advantage in subsequent lending.
The "relationship" in the present paper is similar to that in Nakamura, in that it involves a complementary between deposit and lending services. This relationship, however, involves no production of information, per se. Rather, the joint structuring of deposit and loan terms allow the bank to sort worthy from unworthy borrowers. This interdependence gives the bank a reason to favor its own depositors as borrowers. One result of this joint structuring of terms is that it would be difficult for an outsider to asses the profitability of bank services on a service by service basis. Some loans might appear to earn excess profits, while some deposit services might appear to be underpriced. In this economy, the margin of competition is the profitability of the entire package of services offered. 
The Basic Economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of risk neutral agents, with a total measure of one. Each agent is endowed with some combination of productive abilities and productive resources. In particular, each agent is endowed with a single unit of the resource, which can be transformed into the economy's single consumption good either through investment in agents' projects or through investment in a risk free, constant returns to scale alternative. This alternative yields a return of r units of consumption good for each unit of investment.
Each agent has the ability to operate production projects. To operate, a project requires k > 1 units of the investment good. Projects are risky, with risk depending on a project's type, i {g,b}. A "funded" project of type i --one that receives the necessary investment --is successful with probability p . A successful project produces y > r units of the consumption i good, while an unsuccessful project produces nothing. Given r, the opportunity cost of investment, only type g projects are positive net present value investments. That is, p y < r < p y. 
for every in (0, ,..., ).
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Finally, agents cannot be forced to take an allocation that gives them less expected consumption than they could achieve on their own, by investing their resource endowment in the risk-free alternative. 
Contracts and Institutions
For analytical convenience, the definitions above specify feasibility requirements directly for consumption allocations, or outcomes that might be achieved by whatever market arrangement in which agents interact. The environment is suggestive of a credit market arrangement. Agents who wish to operate productive projects require outside funding. To secure this funding, they will be willing to offer to share some of their output with suppliers of funds. It would be straightforward to recast Definitions 1 -4 in terms of allocations that specify: how many agents of each type in each class receive credit; the repayment made by an agent of a given type and class who has a successful (unsuccessful) project; and the return paid to an agent of a given type and class who invests funds in the projects of others. This paper will focus on two particular types of credit market arrangement. In a securities market arrangement, agents compete for the funds of investors by offering contracts that specify the division of a project's output, between operator and investors, in the case of success and failure. These contracts are evaluated by the market given the market's expectation of the agent's type. This expectation will typically be affected by the agent's class and the nature of the contract offered. In an equilibrium of such a market, each contract that attracts funds must yield (in expected value) the market rate of return to investors.
The alternative arrangement is an intermediated credit market in which coalitions form with some agents participating as investors and others operating projects. In this arrangement, operators make payments to the coalition which, in turn, distributes payments to the investors. One can think of the intermediary coalition as being sponsored by an individual agent who offers a set of terms for prospective participants. Free entry and competition among intermediaries guarantee zero profits for sponsors.
The intermediaries imagined in this framework are essentially the same as those proposed in Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Lacker and Weinberg (1993) . In both of those papers, such coalitions were able to achieve allocations that could not be attained by a securities market. The solution concepts used in this work are adaptations of the core. Unlike the earlier papers, section 5 examines a case in which intermediated finance and a direct securities market can coexist.
The Case of a Single Class
It is useful to begin with the behavior of a version of the economy in which all agents belong to a single class. That is, the entire population is characterized by a single prior probability of being type g. This probability, , satisfies k < 1. Such an economy is a special case of that studied in Lacker and Weinberg (1993) . Hence, proofs of the propositions in this section are omitted. It is, nevertheless, instructive to examine the outcomes of both a securities market and an intermediary arrangement for this case.
It has long been recognized that in this type of adverse selection environment, a securities market equilibrium, in which each transaction stands on its own, can yield inefficient outcomes. For instance, de Meza and Webb (1987) argue that overinvestment is a generic characteristic of equilibrium in these economies. In the present case overinvestment means that, in equilibrium, some type b agents attract funds and operate their production projects. The economy, then, suffers the deadweight loss of some amount of negative net value investments. This is stated more formally below. (r,r) . A separating contract, one that will be offered only by type g agents, must lie on or below 
Note that as gets close to 1 (8) will be violated. Assume for now that this is not the case.
While the securities market arrangement requires that every transaction stand on its own, theories of financial intermediaries in adverse selection environments have posited multilateral arrangements that break-even across all the parties to the arrangement but in which some individuals may pay or receive more than their apparent "market values."
In the present case, such "cross-subsidization" takes the form of some project operators paying (and some investors receiving) more than r in expected value.
The notion of an intermediary is formalized by a core-like requirement on allocations. That is, an equilibrium allocation is one that leaves no incentive for any coalition of agents to break-off and allocate their own resources among themselves. Such a deviation would have to satisfy incentive and resource feasibility constraints for the deviating coalition. Such corelike solutions for adverse selection economies typically involve additional requirements on deviating coalitions, reflecting a coalition's inability to prevent unwanted members from joining (see Boyd and Prescott (1986 agents, pays a rate of return r to investors and lies below the type b indifference curve through (r,r) (B in Figure 1 ). In this case, one might say that a securities market is an efficient institutional setting. In other cases, when condition ii) of proposition 1 is not satisfied, the securities market is not an efficient institution. In these cases, the solution to problem (P) is quite different from the securities market equilibrium. In this environment, if investment (deposit) services and lending were both required to stand on their own, then there would be no distinction between intermediated and nonintermediated arrangements. Simultaneous competition among intermediaries in two distinct markets (raising funds and attracting borrowers) would lead to the same (overinvestment) equilibrium as the securities market arrangement. Intermediaries have a role here because of their ability to offer bundles of services which may not break even on a service-by-service basis.
The above discussion has assumed that the aggregate endowment of investment good is more than sufficient to fund all type g projects. That is, k < 1. If, instead, is big enough that funding all type g's more than exhausts the aggregate resource endowment, the solution to problem (P) is somewhat different from that given in proposition 2. Also, when k > 1, the securities market equilibrium, if it exists, coincides with the solution to (P). This result would follow immediately from the construction of a weighted maximization problem where the maximand is the weighted sum (across classes) of that in (P), with the weights equal to population fractions of each class. The equivalents of constraints (2) and (3) would have to hold across classes, while there would be a constraint (5) and (6) for each class. However, proposition 2 relied on results obtained elsewhere in the literature to argue that the solution to problem (P) met the core-like requirement of being immune to deviations from coalitions of agents. It may not be obvious that those results transfer to the multiple class case. Note, then, that no type g agents can be given expected consumption less than what they would get in their own class's solution to problem (P). If type g agents in some class are receiving less, while type b agents in the same class are receiving no more, than they can deviate from the allocation and provide themselves with their solution to (P); this follows from the pareto optimality (within a class) of solutions to (P). If type g agents in some class receive less than in their single class solution to (P), while type b agents are receiving more, then the type g's can deviate together with some of the type b's in the class to achieve the solution to (P) for a higher ; this follows from the fact that the expected consumption of type g's in solutions to (P) is increasing in . This last argument is a direct application of the logic in Lacker and Weinberg (1993). While agents in each class must receive at least the expected consumption they can achieve in the class's stand-alone solution to (P), some classes may receive more. In particular, under the assumption that k < 1, all type g agents can be funded, even though some classes would be constrained if required to stand alone. Imagine that each class acts as a coalition. A class with k > 1 can offer a class with k < 1 a return of r on resources that the latter would otherwise invest in the risk-free alternative. The latter class would, then, be indifferent between investing the funds itself and forwarding them to the class with k > 1. In this scenario, the constrained class ( k > 1) collects all the gains from the inter-class transaction. One might imagine that those gains could be allocated in some other way. The existence of a sizeable number (measure) of agents in class 0, however, will serve to keep the cost of inter-class funding at the "competitive" rate of r. In short, we have the following. the multiple class case is that these contractual terms must be functions of agents' class. Since class is public information, contractual terms to different classes can be treated as distinct products in a competitive, intermediated market (in which any agent can act as an intermediary). The essence of the intermediated solution is that there is cross subsidization between types. The return to depositing one's funds with an intermediary must be sufficient to induce type b agents to not claim to be type g's by seeking to take out loans. In the case identified by parts iii) of propositions 1-3, such a return must exceed r. To support such a return with zero profits or losses for the intermediary, expected payments on loans must exceed r. Hence, loans in this economy might appear to be "mispriced" when observed in isolation from the broader arrangement determining allocations.
One way of viewing the apparent mispricing of loans is by comparison to an admittedly "naive" benchmark. Suppose that one observed loans made to c ( )
agents in an array of risk classes, but that one was unaware of the underlying adverse selection problem. That is, suppose that one assumed that no participant in the economy had more prior information than simply that the probability of success for a member of class i was p + (1-) 
Conclusion
This paper has followed in the line of research examining the role that financial intermediation can play in allocating resources in the presence of adverse selection. The intermediated solution to the adverse selection problem typically involves some subsidization of "bad types" by "good types." Hence, it may appear to someone observing the behavior of such an economy that the good types are getting a raw deal. In fact, there is a sense in which the apparent severity of the raw deal increases as the severity of the adverse selection problem decreases. In the model above, this shows up in the "smoothing" of loan pricing across classes. Good types in high quality classes pay a greater subsidy than do those in lower classes.
In the model above, direct financing emerges as a way for high quality borrowers to by-pass the cross subsidization inherent in intermediated financing. There is a sense in which the resources spent in this by-pass activity represent socially wasteful expenditures. Aggregate consumption in an economy in which such by-pass was impossible would be greater than in an otherwise identical economy with by-pass. Note, however, that this aggregate improvement would not be a pareto improvement, since high quality borrowers are made better off by the availability of the direct finance route. Nevertheless, the difference in aggregate consumption might lead some to read this model as an endorsement of bank-dominated financial systems, such as that in Germany, as compared to systems like that in the U.S., in which securities markets play a greater role. Such a reading would be mistaken, because the model assumes that there are no resource costs associated with financial intermediation. It would be possible to introduce such a cost into the model; its treatment would be similar to that of a tax on intermediation. With such an addition, movement of some borrowers from intermediated to direct finance could well have an ambiguous affect on the aggregate use of resources in financial activities.
Arguments concerning the relative merits of alternative financial structures or interpretations of observed changes in such structures are often made without explicit reference to a coherent model of the determination of the mix of financial arrangements. Without such a model, normative statements are difficult to evaluate. Since the financial structure of a modern economy is rather complex, the modelling task is challenging. Perhaps we must begin with small steps, such as that offered in this paper.
Recent surveys of financial intermediation theory are found in Bhattacharya and Thakor (1994) and Dewatripont and Tirole(1994).
2. The problems with standard types of competitive market interaction can be seen in the possible non-existence or non-optimality of equilibrium in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance model. In a more general setting, Prescott and Townsend (1984) find that the adverse selection environment is the only one of the private information environments they examine for which they cannot prove a standard welfare theorem on the optimality of competitive equilibrium. 
